For about eleven hours on Thursday, developers who installed or auto-updated the Claude Code extension inside the Cursor editor got a copy Anthropic never built. Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 tried to plant an SSH key and a reverse tunnel on the machine.
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Cursor pulled it and took the attacker’s server offline, but the extension writes files outside its own folder. Removing or updating it leaves those behind, and checking takes one command.
Uninstalling the extension does not remove what it planted. Check authorized_keys for svc-telemetry.
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A tampered Claude Code extension sat in Cursor’s marketplace for 11 hours
Cursor says the malicious Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 builds for Windows and macOS were served from its VS Code extension marketplace from about 2:27 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. Pacific time on October 29. Cursor removed them, shut the marketplace down, rotated its keys, rebuilt it and brought it back.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence analyzed the injected loader on October 30. It collects the hostname, username, OS, Git email and the names (not values) of environment variables containing words like KEY, TOKEN or SECRET. It appends an Ed25519 key labeled svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to turn on the local SSH service and opens a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82[.]225, retrying every 60 seconds. Microsoft says the Visual Studio Marketplace and the npm @anthropic-ai/claude-code package were not affected, and Anthropic told Microsoft its systems were not compromised.
Cursor users on macOS and Windows who updated on October 29
The exposure is narrow: Cursor on macOS or Windows, with the Claude Code extension installed or updated from Cursor’s marketplace during that window. Cursor says turning on SSH needs admin rights the extension usually lacks, so on most machines the tunnel step failed and the attacker could not log in.
The rest still ran. The key, the startup entries and the host report were written, and the startup entries keep retrying. Developer laptops hold cloud credentials, Git tokens and SSH keys, so a planted key on one of them is worth an hour of checking.
Grep for one key name, then clean up and rotate
- On macOS run
grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo found. On Windows check%USERPROFILE%\.ssh\authorized_keysandC:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keysfor the same string. - If it is there, isolate the machine and run Cursor’s remediation script for your platform (as the user on macOS, as administrator on Windows), then confirm nothing listed below remains.
- Rotate credentials and sessions reachable from that machine, from a different, clean device.
- Fleet-wide, search endpoint telemetry for the extension version and for connections to 134.209.82[.]225. Cursor’s hardening guidance covers limiting extensions to approved publishers and adding an install cooldown for new versions.
Forward this
For whoever manages developer laptops: a fake Claude Code extension was served in the Cursor editor’s marketplace on October 29 and tried to add a hidden SSH key. Can we check every Mac and Windows machine with Cursor for an SSH key named svc-telemetry, clean any hits with Cursor’s script, and rotate the credentials on those machines?
Details
- Package: Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313, darwin-arm64 and win32-x64, Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace only. No CVE assigned.
- Window: about 2:27 a.m. to 1:35 p.m. PT, October 29, 2026 (Cursor). Cursor updated its indicators on October 30.
- Persistence: macOS
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.sysmond.plistplus~/.config/.smtand.smtk; Windows scheduled taskSysMon, fallbacksysmon.cmdin the Startup folder,%USERPROFILE%\.config\smt.cmdandsmtk; temp identity files named.stk_plus ten hex characters. - Network and hashes: 134.209.82[.]225 (SSH on 22, beacon on 8099). Loader
extension.jsSHA-256 ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15. Planted key fingerprint SHA256:0Z6R+DF64Do2nwQic8a7kkfDLNNk4IiK+2U2Rci4htk.
Hunt / verify
- Process command lines containing
ssh -N -R '*:0:localhost:22'orautossh -M 0, andschtasks /create /tn SysMonon Windows. - File events for
.smt,.smtk,smt.cmd,sysmon.cmdorcom.apple.sysmond.plist; Microsoft published Defender hunting queries for each. - On macOS,
systemsetup -setremotelogin onin shell history or logs; on Windows, a new OpenSSH Server capability you did not install.
Source: Cursor security notice; Microsoft analysis
Sources
- Cursor: Security notice, malicious version of Anthropic.claude-code (2.1.312 and 2.1.313) in the Cursor VS Code Extension Marketplace
- Microsoft Security Blog: Inside a malicious Claude Code-branded extension and its persistent SSH backdoor
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