An employee at a construction company picked a meeting time on what looked like a Microsoft Teams scheduler, copied a “booking reference”, and pasted it into Microsoft’s real sign-in page. That reference was a device code, and entering it handed the attacker a valid session for the employee’s Microsoft 365 account.
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Huntress described the mid-October incident on November 12. Its team contained it, but the trick needs no software bug, so it works against any tenant that still allows device code sign-in.
The “booking reference” on a fake Teams scheduler was a Microsoft device code. Typing it into Microsoft’s real sign-in page signed the attacker in. Block device code flow if you don’t use it.
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A fake Teams booking page signed an attacker into Microsoft 365
Device code sign-in exists for TVs, printers and command-line tools that can’t show a normal login page: the device shows a short code, and a person enters it at microsoft.com/devicelogin. Attackers start that sign-in themselves and talk a victim into entering their code.
- The lure: an email from a lookalike domain impersonating a real senior vice president at another construction firm, offering an introductory call about a supply partnership.
- Hiding the link: the email linked to a Google share link, which redirected to the fake scheduler, so the attacker’s domain never appeared in the message.
- The swap: clicking “Confirm Meeting” copied the code to the clipboard and opened Microsoft’s real device sign-in page. Afterwards the victim landed on a Calendly page so nothing looked wrong.
- Fallbacks: if Microsoft asked for MFA and the attempt failed, the kit quietly started a new device code session and asked the victim to try again.
Any Microsoft 365 tenant that still allows device code sign-in
The victim never types a password into a fake page, so password managers and lookalike-URL training don’t help. Huntress notes the compromised account had no MFA enrolled, and the attacker routed the stolen session through a home internet connection in New Orleans so it looked like ordinary consumer traffic.
Exploitation is confirmed: this is a real incident Huntress responded to, not a lab demonstration. Huntress says it has tracked several large device code phishing campaigns over the past year.
Block device code flow in Conditional Access, starting in report-only
- In the Microsoft Entra admin center, create a Conditional Access policy that blocks device code flow (Conditions, Authentication flows). Microsoft recommends excluding break-glass accounts and starting in report-only mode.
- Check the report-only results for anyone who genuinely uses device code sign-in, such as conference room devices or admin tools, and scope an exception for them before switching the policy on.
- Make sure every account has MFA enrolled, and prefer phishing-resistant methods for executives and finance staff.
- Tell staff that no meeting booking, PDF or invoice should ever ask them to type a code into a Microsoft sign-in page.
- Reviewing sign-in logs for this is everyday SOC work. Our CySA+ exam guide covers the detection and log analysis side.
Forward this
For whoever manages our Microsoft 365 accounts: attackers are using fake Teams meeting schedulers to trick staff into typing a sign-in code that hands the attacker their account. Microsoft lets us block this sign-in method with one Conditional Access policy. Can we test that policy in report-only mode this week and turn it on if nothing we use depends on it?
Details
- Technique: OAuth device authorization grant (device code flow) phishing. No CVE: this abuses a legitimate Microsoft sign-in feature.
- Report: Huntress, November 12, 2026 (Andrea Hatcher, Matt Poto, Lindsey O’Donnell-Welch). Incident observed mid-October 2026 at a construction company.
- Infrastructure: attacker backend gpimmlgration[.]com; the phishing kit shipped as AES-256-GCM ciphertext decrypted in the browser, so scanners that don’t run JavaScript see nothing.
- Exploitation: confirmed in the wild (Huntress incident response).
Hunt / verify
- In Entra sign-in logs, filter on authentication protocol “Device code” and review every recent success, especially from unmanaged devices or residential IP ranges.
- Look for Cmsi:Cmsi sign-ins to Microsoft Authentication Broker and for user agents such as python-requests or node, which Huntress flags as automated attacker tooling.
- After any hit, check for new MFA methods, newly registered devices, app consents, inbox rules and unusual outbound mail.
Source: Huntress report; Microsoft: block authentication flows
Sources
- Huntress: Crafty Microsoft Teams booking flow disguises device code phishing
- Help Net Security: How attackers turned a Teams meeting booking into a device code phishing trap
- Microsoft Learn: Block authentication flows with Conditional Access policy
- Microsoft Learn: Authentication flows in Conditional Access
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