A fake Teams booking page tricked an employee into signing in the attacker. Block device code sign-in

By George Bailey   Published: 11/16/26   4 min read

An employee at a construction company picked a meeting time on what looked like a Microsoft Teams scheduler, copied a “booking reference”, and pasted it into Microsoft’s real sign-in page. That reference was a device code, and entering it handed the attacker a valid session for the employee’s Microsoft 365 account.

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Huntress described the mid-October incident on November 12. Its team contained it, but the trick needs no software bug, so it works against any tenant that still allows device code sign-in.

The “booking reference” on a fake Teams scheduler was a Microsoft device code. Typing it into Microsoft’s real sign-in page signed the attacker in. Block device code flow if you don’t use it.

A fake Teams booking page signed an attacker into Microsoft 365

Device code sign-in exists for TVs, printers and command-line tools that can’t show a normal login page: the device shows a short code, and a person enters it at microsoft.com/devicelogin. Attackers start that sign-in themselves and talk a victim into entering their code.

Any Microsoft 365 tenant that still allows device code sign-in

The victim never types a password into a fake page, so password managers and lookalike-URL training don’t help. Huntress notes the compromised account had no MFA enrolled, and the attacker routed the stolen session through a home internet connection in New Orleans so it looked like ordinary consumer traffic.

Exploitation is confirmed: this is a real incident Huntress responded to, not a lab demonstration. Huntress says it has tracked several large device code phishing campaigns over the past year.

Block device code flow in Conditional Access, starting in report-only

Forward this

For whoever manages our Microsoft 365 accounts: attackers are using fake Teams meeting schedulers to trick staff into typing a sign-in code that hands the attacker their account. Microsoft lets us block this sign-in method with one Conditional Access policy. Can we test that policy in report-only mode this week and turn it on if nothing we use depends on it?

Details

Hunt / verify

Source: Huntress report; Microsoft: block authentication flows

Sources

George Bailey

George Bailey is the byline of the CyberExperts editorial desk, the team behind the CyberExperts Daily Brief. The desk covers vulnerabilities, breaches and security news from vendor advisories, CISA alerts and other primary sources, and links those sources in every story. Questions or corrections: [email protected].